A comparative analysis of three marine governance systems for implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) by Jones, Estelle V et al.
Marine Policy 66 (2016) 30–38Contents lists available at ScienceDirectMarine Policyhttp://d
0308-59
n Corr
Building
E-mjournal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpolA comparative analysis of three marine governance systems for
implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
Estelle Victoria Jones a,d,n, Tim Gray d, Donald Macintosh b,c, Selina Stead a
a School of Marine Science and Technology, Newcastle University, NE1 7RU UK
b Department of Bioscience, University of Aarhus, DK 8000 Denmark
c Mangroves of the Future, Bangkok, Thailand
d School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, NE1 7RU UKa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 19 August 2015
Received in revised form
11 January 2016
Accepted 12 January 2016
Available online 21 January 2016
Keywords:
Convention on Biological Diversity
Marine governance
Marine protected areas
Shared governance
Community
Thailandx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.01.016
7X/Crown Copyright & 2016 Published by Els
esponding author at: School of Marine Scie
, Newcastle University, NE1 7RU UK.
ail address: estelle.jones@ncl.ac.uk (E.V. Jonesa b s t r a c t
Successful implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) requires critical reﬂection on
governance structures especially in the biodiverse tropics where institutional capacity is weak and
fragmented. This paper explores three modes of marine governance in Thailand and discusses the
challenges each faces when delivering conservation and sustainable development objectives. Focusing on
Marine Protected Areas (MPA), the dominant management approaches to biodiversity conservation,
centralised, decentralised and shared governance, are scrutinised through a review of the literature and
24 key informant interviews with leading Thai academics, national and regional government ofﬁcers and
NGOs. We ﬁnd both the centralised, state-managed MPA system and the decentralised, community-
based MPA system to have severe limitations, for different reasons, in protecting biodiversity, whereas
shared governance, despite being less common, is the best intermediate mode. Shared governance is the
most viable option available in Thailand for working towards key CBD targets because: (1) local parti-
cipation can legitimise much of the relationship with the centralised system and can help embed a
decentralised system in natural resources management; (2) the centralised system will still remain in
ultimate control, which, whilst not favoured by those who want decentralisation, will satisfy powerful
elites, and offer more opportunity to empower local people to take responsibility for conservation tar-
gets; and (3) the capacity of both local and national stakeholders can be built to deal with the complexity
of the marine environment.
Crown Copyright & 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is the
overarching framework for stemming and reversing biodiversity
loss by “the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable
use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of ben-
eﬁts arising from the use of genetic resources” [51]. Central to
achieving these key goals - conservation, sustainable use and
equitable share - are governance structures, which are most likely
critical to implementing successful conservation of biological di-
versity [3,4]. References to governance are frequent in key policy
documents surrounding the CBD and particularly in the Aichi
targets, such as target 11 for Protected Areas (PAs), which refers to
“formal inclusion in the national systems and practicing of various
governance types” [6]. Yet little critical reﬂection or guidance isevier Ltd. This is an open access a
nce and Technology, Ridley
).given on the challenges posed by different governance structures
for implementing the CBD, especially in the biologically rich tro-
pics where institutional capacity is often fragmented and weak [4].
In this study, we explore the modes of marine and coastal
governance in place to progress biodiversity conservation in
Thailand and discuss the challenges they face in doing so. Thailand
was chosen as a case study for two reasons. First, because it is a
biodiversity hotspot – this area has been identiﬁed as the most
northerly limit of Malesian ﬂora meeting biota from the Indo-Hi-
malayan and Indo-Chinese sources which has resulted in an ex-
tremely high concentration of biogeographic complexity and bio-
diversity [50]. Second, Thailand has a long history of establishing
protected areas – it has one of the oldest protected areas (PA)
systems in tropical Asia, the ﬁrst PA was inaugurated in 1961 and,
as a proportion of national territory, is stated as one of the world's
largest PA systems owned and governed by the state [21], although
ofﬁcial statistics on coverage are lacking. Moreover, Thailand en-
dorsed the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1992 and
ratiﬁed it in October 2003. This resulted in extensive efforts to
document the country's natural assets and review conservationrticle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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mulation of the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
(NBSAP), which coordinates national interests and actions re-
quired under the CBD. In Thailand’s current NBSAP at least 20% of
marine and coastal areas are to be designated for protection by
2020.
However, recent political instability and administrative inertia
within centralised institutions ingrained in traditional approaches
to management is affecting the way that Thailand's PAs are func-
tioning. As with many other coastal nations, Thailand uses MPAs as
its key mechanism to deliver biodiversity protection in the marine
environment. These MPAs are generally managed under three
different institutional structures: a centralised system focused
around the state-managed MPAs known as Marine National Parks
(MNP) and the most dominant mode; a decentralised system re-
presented by locally governed/community-based managed (CBM)
MPAs; and shared governance which includes co-managed (Co-M)
MPAs. This study examines these three modes of governance by
assessing the challenges each faces in implementing successful
marine biodiversity conservation. Our ﬁndings are that both the
centralised, state-managed MPA system and the decentralised,
community-based MPA system suffer from severe limitations (for
different reasons) for protecting biodiversity. Shared governance,
despite being less common, is the best response to implementing
conservation policy, because it enables capacity building to take
place at both local and national levels so each can assume ap-
propriate levels of responsibility.2. Methods
Two main sources of data were used. First, a systematic review
of Thai literature was undertaken, sourced through government,
university and non-governmental organisation (NGO) websites
which supplied much of the grey literature, white papers and
approved translations of Thai legislation. Obtaining versions of the
literature in English was a limiting factor, but much was available
from industry bodies, government departments and Thai and
foreign academics. Some of these documents were peer-reviewed
while others ranged from personal perspectives to institutional
recommendations and advisory reports. Bibliographical databases
were searched to access articles on Thailand in English in aca-
demic journals, monographs and reports.
Second, 24 key informant (KI) face-to-face interviews were
conducted between January and February 2012 with leading aca-
demics, national and regional government ofﬁcers and NGOs.
Government ofﬁcers and NGOs were identiﬁed through consulta-
tion with the International Union of the Conservation of Nature
(IUCN) in Bangkok, whose staff are members of steering com-
mittees on a range of environmental projects and are acquainted
with key personnel from many government departments. Local
key informants were selected through the provincial and regional
government ofﬁces, mainly the Department of Fisheries (DoF) and
the Department of Marine and Natural Resources (DMCR); and
through the local Tambon Administration Ofﬁces for local elected
leaders. Once a preliminary list of KIs was compiled and interviews
commenced, snowball sampling was employed with the inter-
viewees to recruit other suitable informants. The selection criteria
for national and academic informants were that they should have
worked in some capacity on MPAs during the last 10 years, with
some insight into management, and that the interviews could be
conducted in English. For local ofﬁcers/leaders, the objective was
to obtain as wide a range of perspectives as possible in the given
time. These interviews in almost all cases were conducted in Thai,
face-to-face through an interpreter. Fourteen national key in-
formants were interviewed and ten local ofﬁcers/leaders.Community group interviews were also conducted in eight villages
between February and June 2011, which supplied data on the in-
formal governance structures and interactions with local ofﬁcials
in the region. Key informants data in this paper is referenced in
square brakets [], and coded as [Nat. GO #n] for interviewees who
are national level government ofﬁcers; [Lo. GO #n] for inter-
viewees who are local level government ofﬁcers; [Ac. #n] who are
members of an academic institution; and [NGO #n] who are
members of a non-government organisation. Data taken from the
literature is numbered in parentheses.3. Theory
3.1. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and good
governance
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) obliges countries
which have ratiﬁed the Convention to protect their biodiversity.
With 85% of terrestrial [45] and 100% of the marine environment
(41% strongly) affected by human activity [17], global diversity is
decreasing as increasing numbers of species on land and at sea are
experiencing threats of extinction [32]. The CBD is the overarching
framework for stemming and reversing this trend, and with 190
signatory nations, this convention is far-reaching. The Convention
recognises that biodiversity loss mostly arises as a secondary
consequence of economic activities such as agriculture, forestry,
ﬁsheries, water supply, transportation, urban development, and
energy [46]. Therefore dealing with these factors is a key obliga-
tion. The Convention does not set particular targets for each
country as its provisions are expressed as overall goals i.e. to work
towards achieving components under the 20 Aichi targets relevant
to individual nations. The responsibility for determining how
provisions are implemented falls to signatory nations so that cir-
cumstances speciﬁc to each country can be taken into account
[46]. However, the 2010 deadline for achieving overarching targets
were missed [2,29,47] and we are half way toward the 2020
deadline with little sign of biodiversity loss abating [18,48].
Given the stance of the CBD as guide-line targets only, the
structure of governance for implementing biodiversity conserva-
tion is not prescribed beyond the principle of ‘good governance’
(GG). GG is a set of overarching principles that promote partici-
pation, transparency and fairness (see [28]), which not only chal-
lenges illegitimate regimes but is advocated as a means for solving
environmental problems such as climate change, food security and
biodiversity loss [30,40]. However, the principles of GG are ideals,
and their application on the ground is never complete but always
involves compromise, trade-offs between power structures, and
hidden agendas. As stated by Balmford et al. [1]
“Most of us behave as if our ongoing destruction of biological
diversity and natural ecosystem has a net beneﬁcial effect on
our personal well-being. This is because it often has - locally, in
the short term, and for people with the most power” (p. 212)
Obtaining GG is thus deeply problematic, and its implementa-
tion “calls for improvements that touch virtually all aspects of the
public sector” ([16], p. 525). Often countries most in need of GG
are institutionally weak, their leadership corrupt and civil society
disempowered and disenfranchised, which means they stand little
chance of achieving GG. To deal with this reality, Grindle suggests
the concept of ‘Good Enough Governance’ which stresses priorities
relevant to individual countries focusing on feasibility rather than
a daunting list of ‘must haves’ as “institutions and capacity-
building are products of time” (2004, p. 554). This paper explores
these fundamental challenges and critiques Thailand's progress
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governance structures in place.
3.2. Alternative modes of governance
There are three broad modes of governance in the literature:
centralised; decentralised; and shared. Centralised governance is
the most common form found in past colonial and post-colonial
societies [9] and has been described by Imperial and Yandle [23] as
the default position. Sometimes referred to as hierarchical gov-
ernance, this mode is ‘state-centric’ and includes top-down
structures, centralisation, bureaucracy, command and control, and
scientiﬁc elitism [15]. Bureaucratic arrangements typify this mode
of governance where property rights are held by the government
on behalf of the people and national regulations are developed to
manage them [23]. Orders and directions come from the top and
work their way down for implementation. In Thailand, the cen-
tralised mode of governance is exempliﬁed in the system of ‘Na-
tional Parks’ (NP).
However, across the developing world, decentralised govern-
ance has been evolving since the 1970s and elements of it are now
present in over 80% of developing and former communist coun-
tries, focusing on lower levels of government involved in man-
agement [39]. De Oliveira discusses three forms of decentralisa-
tion; (1) deconcentration; (2) delegation and; (3) devolution.
“Deconcentration implies the transfer of tasks in a government
agency from central ofﬁces (generally located in the capital) to
ofﬁces located closer to the served population… Delegation, in
contrast, involves decentralising tasks from the central gov-
ernment to other public organisations such as special function
agencies or public corporations. Devolution entails the com-
plete transfer of decisions regarding certain public responsi-
bilities from a central government to a lower level govern-
ment.” ([39], p. 1715)
The form of decentralisation most relevant to the present study
is devolution to local communities – i.e. community-based man-
agement (CBM)- which has a long history in the marine environ-
ment in Southeast Asia, often involving a large number of stake-
holders, with local government and NGO support [10].
The third mode of governance is shared governance, which has
emerged more recently as a means of implementing natural re-
source management. Shared governance, often synonymous with
the term co-management (Co-M), is deﬁned as “the sharing of
responsibility and authority between government and the com-
munity” ([42], p. 466) and can be understood as a “two-track ap-
proach” at a local and national scale, usually involving two or more
groups. Co-management can be viewed as a more mature process
than CBM where policy-makers and resource users have both a
willingness and a capacity to collaborate [9].1 The terms ‘dominant discourse’ and ‘challenging discourse’ are taken from
Foucault.4. Natural resource governance in Thailand
In Thailand, the deputy prime minister (2010–2014) and past
minister of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
(MoNRE), Plodprasop Suraswadi, has repeatedly stated his belief
that “man [sic] and nature cannot coexist”. This belief informs the
centralised, top-down way in which the country has managed and
enforces its Protected Areas (PAs) which include both terrestrial
and marine ecosystems and are the bedrock of Thailand’s natural
resource protection strategy [21]. In Thailand, the dominant en-
vironmental discourse is that humans are harmful to nature, so
that non-human species must be protected from human damage
by being located in specially-guarded areas. This belief is used toweaken counter arguments for greater community involvement
and management in the country’s PAs ([14], p. 208), because Thai
ofﬁcials place little trust in local people whose resource needs are
perceived as a threat when they reside in, or near, the country’s
remaining natural landscapes [5].
Nevertheless, opposition to this prevailing centralised mode of
governance has been growing, and community rights to natural
resource management have been advocated and campaigned for
decades, resulting in the drafting of the Community Forest Bill in
the early 1990s and more recently the Marine and Coastal Re-
source Management Bill drafted in 2007. However, neither Bill has
been ratiﬁed. One ofﬁcial in 2001 declared that “local communities
‘cannot possibly’ manage coastal resources ‘because they do not
have the right.’” ([24], p. 124), and legislatively this is still the case.
But it is also increasingly acknowledged in Thailand that new ap-
proaches to the management of marine resources are needed
[22,36], with an emerging paradigm for more public participation
in natural resource management more widely.
“Support should be given to empower communities and to
advocate their rights to gain access to and utilise natural re-
sources. Amendments to legislation are needed to address in-
equality among communities regarding access to and utilisa-
tion of natural resources.” ([36], p. XXI)
This paradigm shift was manifested in the 1997 ‘People’s
Constitution’ which refocused centralised decision-making to-
wards citizen involvement, with the objective of serving wider
societal interests rather than just those of the country’s elites [26].
The People's Constitution advocates public participation in natural
resource management and environmental preservation;
“The State shall promote and encourage public participation in
the preservation, maintenance and balanced exploitation of
natural resources and biological diversity and in the promotion,
maintenance and protection of the quality of the environment”
(1997: Article 79)
The People's Constitution was followed by the National Gov-
ernment Decentralisation Act in 1998 and the Reform Act in 1999
to address what was perceived as an ineffective centralised sys-
tem. The aim was to replace it with an efﬁcient, integrated and
participatory system of governance and to resolve problems of
overlapping and competing jurisdictions within government
agencies. These developments have “marked a new era in Thai
governance and administrative reform” ([22]: 35).
So the current mode of marine governance in Thailand is
conﬂicted between two competing discourses: (1) the historically
dominant discourse of centralised management; and (2) a modern
challenging discourse of decentralised management.1 The cen-
tralised discourse is underpinned by four key Acts of Parliament
that govern the marine and coastal areas (Table 1). All these Acts
impact on MPAs but the key pieces of legislation are the National
Park Act B.E. 2504 (1961) and the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947).
The National Park Act governs terrestrial and marine parks as non-
extractive use areas (recreation only), with no private ownership,
whilst the Fisheries Act applies species and gear speciﬁc man-
agement, as well as separating small-scale from commercial ﬁsh-
ing areas.
Along with the four Acts, the National Economic and Social
Development Plans (NESDP) are important guiding documents.
These plans make recommendations to the Thai cabinet and prime
minister on key government policies and major development
projects and cover ﬁve-year periods. Past plans, reﬂecting the
Table 1
Key legislation for marine and coastal areas in Thailand.
Act Departments Ministry Description
Fisheries Act, B.E. 2490 (1947) DoF MoNRE Regulates inland and marine ﬁsheries and aquaculture. Classiﬁes’‘ﬁsheries’ as; (1) preservation
ﬁsheries; (2) leasable ﬁsheries; (3) reserved ﬁsheries; and (4) public ﬁsheries. Preservation
ﬁsheries are no-take areas. Leasable and reserved ﬁsheries are restricted by licensees unless for
subsistence [freshwater only]. Public ﬁsheries are open access.
National Park Act, B.E. 2504 (1961) DNP MoAC Regulates ‘National Parks’ comprises ‘land’, ‘woody plants’ and ‘animals’. No land determined as
national park can be owned or legally possessed by anyone other than the state. All terrestrial
and marine national parks forbid extraction, but can support non-extractive activity such as
tourism and recreation.
Wildlife Preservation and Protection Act,
B.E. 2535 (1992)
DoF-aquatic MoNRE Regulates the hunting, possession, breeding and trade of wildlife in Thailand. Wildlife sanctuaries
and no-hunting wildlife areas are regulated under this Act by the DNP. ‘Wildlife Sanctuaries’ are
strict no-entry, no-hunting zones. ‘No-hunting Wildlife Area’ are areas where people can fre-
quent but not hunt.
DNP -wildlife
RFD-plants
National Forest Reserve Act B.E. 2507
(1964)
RFD MoNRE Regulates protected forests for biodiversity and water-shed management. No forest determined
under this Act can be owned, cleared, burnt or products collected. Logging and collection under
permission of the ministry only. Degraded forests can be reclassiﬁed under the land reform
scheme.
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The current NESDP (2012–2016), reﬂecting the decentralised dis-
course, is focused on public participation, with “the representation
of stakeholders from every segment of Thai society… so that every
segment has equal opportunity and access to resources to beneﬁt
from development fairly” (2011: Foreword). The current plan ac-
knowledges the severe degradation of coastal areas and their in-
adequate management, and recommends that “the management
system governing land ownership and marine and coastal re-
sources should undergo reform” (2011: XX); that conservation
lands should occupy at least 19% of total area, and forest reserves
up to 40%; that at least 5000 rai per year is required for mangrove
reforestation; and that communities should participate in coastal
management for sustainable ﬁsheries. This plan is extensive and
ambitious, but there is no overarching plan for its implementation
in either terrestrial and marine PAs [13,22].5. Results and discussion
The results of the study show that there are three modes of
marine governance in Thailand: centralised; decentralised; and a
mixture of the two.
5.1. Domination by the centralised system of resource governance
5.1.1. Department of National Parks
Thailand's national system of marine resource protection is
predominantly centralised and bureaucratic. At the heart of the
centralised system are the Department of National Parks (DNP)
and the Department of Fisheries (DoF). The DNP has jurisdiction
over 20% of state-held land containing the vast majority of the
country's natural resources and is at the centre of natural resource
protection. The National Park Act is administered at the national
level through a superintendent and non-local teams in each park.
Managerial arrangements are made in Bangkok with little input
from site-level staff [13] or local people.
Many criticisms have been made of the way the DNP has ad-
ministered the national parks (NPs). One criticism is about the
practice of unofﬁcial grading for NPs, which are termed as A, B, or
C parks, with the last informally known as ‘punishment parks’. ‘A’
grade parks are highly visited and therefore have high potential for
generating revenue, and often higher management is ‘sponsored’
into the position in exchange for privileged access to revenue
streams offered by the park. ‘C’ grade or ‘punishment parks’ are
remote, unvisited and low earning; they are reserved for new of-
ﬁcers, or those who have challenged the modus operandi. ‘B’ gradeparks fall in between [Nat. GO #3; Ac. #4]. This practice is very
problematic, because it supports inertia, prioritises revenue above
protection, limits positive and proactive change, and encourages
ofﬁcials to service the networks that placed them there rather
than to improve the well-being of a location [21].
Another criticism is that in almost all marine national parks
(MNPs), whilst traditional extraction is outlawed, tourism-based
operations are not restricted. Tourism is viewed as low impact, yet
infrastructure developments, such as site-hardening, accom-
modation and ‘beautiﬁcation’ can be invasive and damaging.
Critics highlight the bias towards the anthropogenic enjoyment
that ‘parks’ tend to support rather than the conservation of bio-
logical diversity [8].
A further criticism is that to reduce conﬂict and tension, mul-
tiple-use permits are allowed on a case-by-case basis in most
MNPs [13], under the ‘whim’ of individual superintendents.
Therefore, behind the façade of a national system of protected
areas, almost all sites are actually governed on an ad-hoc, site-
speciﬁc basis [Nat. GO #3; NGO #4]. There are no guidelines for
local management because the National Park Act does not re-
cognise locally-based management. A key informant [Ac. #4] said
that NPs have become hotspots for marketers, investors and ven-
ture capitalists who grab land and destroy much of the traditional
resource management systems that local communities previously
put in place.
Accordingly, although local people are critical of the NP system
when restrictions are placed on them, there is a genuine concern
for resource depletion and many local people feel that stronger
management is required. Many local people support no-take areas
in principle [Lo. GO #7; Lo. GO #8], but past arbitrary management
of MNPs and a failure to protect parks from commercial ﬁsheries
has left high levels of mistrust and scepticism of the centralised
management system [Nat. GO #2; Nat. GO #3; NGO #3; Ac. #4].
The establishment of new MNPs is now viewed with increased
concern as many local residents believe ratiﬁcation brings de-
gradation to sites previously unknown and unfrequented [NGO
#4]. As a result, several proposed MNPs have been blocked by local
opposition and stalled for years during the process of consultation
which the 1992 National Environmental Quality Act (NEQA) leg-
islates as necessary to obtain local support of all future protected
areas [31].
5.1.2. Department of Fisheries
The second key institution in marine resource management,
the Department of Fisheries, has sole responsibility for ﬁsheries
management in Thailand. A centralised department with pro-
vincial ofﬁces, the DoF has until very recently been focused solely
2 “disinformation disseminated by an organisation so as to present an en-
vironmentally responsible public image” Resource: Oxford English Dictionary.
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proﬁtable industry [37]. To improve export revenue, the Thai
government with agency assistance subsidised ﬂeet expansion in
the 1980s [11]. The result is that the DoF is now left with the
difﬁcult task of reducing the country's over-sized ﬂeet and re-
storing over-exploited stocks in Thailand's Economic Exclusion
Zones (EEZ) [Nat. GO #4]. This shift from a development to a
conservation, or sustainable exploitation agenda, has prompted a
shift away from a centralised development strategy towards more
localised management measures. Historically, the DoF has focused
on macro-level policy - the ‘larger picture’ of the size of the ﬂeet,
catch per unit effort and limiting/banning destructive gear from its
waters - but with the inauguration of the Tambon Act (local gov-
ernment) 1994, micro-level issues of local management have
challenged the traditional approach of this department [Nat. GO
#4].
This shift has been fraught with difﬁculties, however, because
the government points to an aged legal framework and the open
access nature of Thai ﬁsheries as the causes of overﬁshing [27],
whereas the general public attributes overﬁshing to overlapping
jurisdictions of different agencies leading to poor enforcement of
ﬁsheries laws. Both interpretations, it would appear, have cred-
ibility. Open and free access has resulted in displacement of ﬁshers
between seas when restrictive measures are put in place, and local
resentment is common, with local management being under-
mined due to ﬁshing by visiting vessels [Nat. Go #4; Ac. #2; Ac.
#4]. The Fisheries Act has no set limits regarding the number of
ﬁsh taken, nor effective enforcement of catch size beyond MLS,
while gear type restrictions have not kept pace with the change in
ﬂeet composition. Knight et al. [27] found extensive confusion at a
government level about enforcement mechanisms, which has re-
sulted in local communities attempting to establish informal reg-
ulations to control the rate of decline of marine and coastal re-
sources [31]. Whilst local ﬁsheries ofﬁcers have a better local im-
age than have national park ofﬁcers, most probably because of past
development agendas, as resources have degraded and conﬂicts
increased between users, the DoF is increasingly being viewed as
ineffective at a local level when conﬂict resolution or restrictive
legalisation is required [Lo. GO #7; Nat. GO #6].
5.1.3. The ‘fortress’ concept of conservation
Underlying the centralised mode of natural resource protection
is the ‘fortress’ concept of conservation. The fortress concept re-
ﬂects the view that humans are external to the natural ecosystem,
exerting pressure on it from outside, and that the best way to
protect natural resources is to keep humans away, which entails
establishing PAs from which humans are excluded, often termed
no-take zones (NTZ). Middle-class fears of lost wilderness and
natural equilibrium [14] reinforced the fortress model and ensures
that Thailand’s NP have remained, on paper, NTZs. Advocates of
the fortress concept see the centralised natural resource protection
as a mode which must continue if key CBD targets are to be met
[Nat. GO # 1].
The adoption of the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action
Plan (NBSAP) to deliver the CBD targets reinforced the dominance
of the centralised system, and sector agencies currently in charge
of biological resources are being held responsible for achieving
this international commitment [Nat. GO #1]. In Thailand, there is
no shortage of legislation to protect biodiversity, though there are
inadequate resources to enforce it;
“there were fourteen Acts, two cabinet resolutions, ﬁve na-
tional plans and policies (including the NBSAP) and two de-
partmental regulations related to the conservation of biodi-
versity. Thus, limited achievement in conserving biodiversity is
not due to inadequate legislation, but rather to a lack ofefﬁcient capacity to enforce and implement provisions of the
existing laws and regulations.” [22]
This highly protective fortress model has been combined with a
continual drive for growth, and as a leading agricultural exporting
nation, Thailand is a classic example of a country being required to
“do more with less” resulting in intensive farming (shrimp and
rice farming are two examples) in the remaining available space
([12], p. 857). So NPs and the ecosystems protected within them
are often functioning in isolation, whilst surrounding areas are
being intensely cultivated to support local livelihoods and boost
economic output.
5.1.4. Has centralisation got a future?
Because of the dominant position of the state's structure, cen-
tralised governance of natural resources in Thailand is set to
continue into the future. But there are four issues that need to be
addressed to create a centralised system that could meet CBD re-
quirements. (1) There needs to be a standard, fair and consistent
enforcement of the rules that are considered legitimate by those
most affected, and the people who bear most of the impact from
restrictions should be compensated for their losses. (2) Tourism
needs to be balanced with other forms of sustainable resource
utilisation. Not all MPAs are suitable for tourism ventures, and in
many areas local people have no desire to be exposed to tourism,
so management should permit the MNP model to consider sus-
tainable extraction. (3) Natural Resource Management (NRM)
legislation needs to be reviewed and integrated to deal with the
unique challenges posed by the marine environment. It was ac-
knowledged in the CBD third national report [38], that manage-
ment principles of MNPs need reviewing in Thailand to remove
their inappropriate terrestrial foundation within the National Park
Act (1964), and sustainable resource extraction should be a central
consideration in this review. (4) Conservation needs to be taken
seriously by the state and performance measured, because pro-
tected areas are commonly perceived as green washing2 and a thin
veil for development of tourism [13,43,8].
5.2. A decentralised system of resource governance
The historically dominant centralised, fortress mode of natural
resource governance in Thailand is facing increasing challenge by a
decentralised, community-based mode of natural resource gov-
ernance. Critics of the fortress concept claim that humans are an
integral part of the social ecological system and an important
factor in shaping the natural environment. In Thailand, this ‘parks
versus people’ debate has taken the form of top-down NP pro-
tection versus bottom–up community management which is ex-
empliﬁed in the Community Forest Bill. However, although de-
centralisation has been proposed for decades and legislated for
through the Decentralisation Act 1999, limited headway has been
made to streamline legalisation to fully support this mode of
governance [Ac. #1; NGO #2; NGO # 4; Ac. #4; Lo. GO # 7]. At
present, the weakest form of decentralisation - deconcentration -
is the most commonly promoted in Thailand. The most extreme
form of decentralisation - community-based governance - is the
least promoted, though the principle of community participation
lies at the root of all forms of decentralisation.
5.2.1. Deconcentration
Deconcentration is the approach formulated in the Tambon
Administration Organisations (TAO) Act (1997) whereby tasks are
transferred to local ofﬁces for implementation [44], though
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power rather than to the local populace. The strength of the
hierarchical system is such that provincial and district leaders are
for “want of a better term, absentee administrative lords of TAOs”
([44], p. 43) as the local ofﬁce is still dependent on the centralised
ofﬁce for its budget, instructions and decision-making rules
[22,39]. This persistent hierarchalism is reinforced by the fact that
provincial governors and sub-district ofﬁcers have power under
the 1994 Tambon Act to remove any elected Tambon member on:
(1) behavioural or moral grounds; (2) poor performance; or (3) if
they are perceived as having a conﬂict of interest [33,34], and it is
unclear how these faults are deﬁned. TAOs are mandated to pro-
duce local environmental plans every ﬁve years, which includes
PAs in the administration area. Communities within or adjacent to
such areas can input into PA management through the TAO plan-
ning document. This is generally coordinated through a village
head, or Community-Based Organisations (CBOs). This structure is
enjoying increased growth and inﬂuence and includes private
sector stakeholders consisting of tour operators, commercial ﬁsh-
ers and swift nest collectors3 [22]. However, local community
members, especially small-scale resources users, whilst “aware of
their legal rights to access and participate in local resource man-
agement [are] unsure on how to exercise those rights” and local
buy-in for sustainable management or resource protection is still
low (Wright 2009, p.3). Targets under the CBD in Thailand tend to
bypass local ofﬁcials apart from requesting approaches to en-
vironmental education and incentives for improved compliance
([22], p.55). Little inﬂuence over, or responsibility for, delivery of
CBD goals has been established at the Tambon level (Emphandhu
and Chettemart 2003). For example, the participation of local
people, and the monitoring and controlling of human impacts in
PAs were given low priority in the country’s CBD national plan,
which is a major concern given that the PA system is home to the
vast majority of the country’s biodiversity.
5.2.2. Delegation
Delegating responsibility for natural resource management to
special agencies or public organisations is not common in Thai-
land. Agencies such as the UN and the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) are often on steering committees
for government projects, but administrative responsibilities are
invariably held in government departments. Large NGOs who have
been favoured by donor agencies since the 1990s and are abun-
dant in Thailand, generally have mandates which fall outside the
realms of government [Nat. GO #6; NGO #4]. Programmes often
overstate the inﬂuences NGOs have in policy formation, and un-
derplay the inﬂuence local people have legally at their disposal
through the decentralised structure [25]. This is not to under-
estimate the value NGOs bring in Thailand, but they are remote
from government and often perform under their own mandates
which are set external to the state.
5.2.3. Devolution
For many commentators, devolution lies at the heart of de-
centralisation [39], falling into the category of bottom–up or
community-based management (CBM) [9] in the MPA literature.
Devolution has been promoted for decades in Thailand, but is yet
to have a serious impact on natural resource management. His-
torically local management in Thailand was through the traditional
system of Puu Yai Baan (village leader) and Kham nan (sub-district
chief) and was considered a ‘channel of transmission’ from the3 Swift nests are edible bird’s nests particularly prized in Chinese culture. They
are among the most expensive animal products consumed by humans and are
harvested along the coastlines of Southeast Asia.district level to people on the ground who could ‘get things done’
[44]. Devolution since the 1990s attempted to introduce locally-
elected provincial governors and rural administration units, the
TAO, that were answerable to the local electorate. However, locally
elected provincial governors were never introduced, because of
strong opposition from the Ministry of Interior , though the TAO
was established under the Tambon Council and Tambon Admin-
istration Act in 1994 [33,34]. Under this Act a range of responsi-
bilities were devolved to the smallest administration unit (sub-
district - a group of between 6 to 10 villages). Some of these local
responsibilities were mandatory and others optional. The “pro-
tection, supervision and maintenance of natural resources and the
environment” is one of the nine mandatory services the TAO has to
provide. This mandate is clearly stated in the two local adminis-
tration acts - TAO Act 1994 and the Decentralisation Act 1999.
However, devolving services to local authorities has proved pro-
blematic in some cases [33,34]. For example, the DoF handed over
1000 ﬁsh ponds to local authorities to maintain and manage, but
because funding is limited to the maintenance of old projects, most
of these ponds were abandoned [33,34]. This problem arises because
ﬁnancial autonomy has yet to be allocated, and because the neces-
sary expertise is not always available at a local level for the main-
tenance of infrastructure such as ground water systems [Lo. GO #7].
The more serious problem of devolving the duty of meeting CBD
targets is that Thailand’s CBD targets are a national obligation, so any
TAO which has relevant resources under its ‘jurisdiction’ will be in-
structed by a centralised department, since ultimately the buck stops
with the government rather than with the TAO.
The most devolved form of decentralisation, community-based
management (CBM) is not as common in Thailand as in other
Southeast Asia countries. Traditional forms of community man-
agement through the Puu Yai Bann and Kham nan system are
widespread, but these tend to be ruled by district and provincial
elites. This structure has cultural components linked to the age-old
patron–client relationship, as locally elected representatives have
to ‘look after their ﬂock’ and report up to higher echelons of
power. Rural areas are more exposed to paternalism than are ur-
ban areas since provincial and central governors still consider it
their role to ‘take care’ of rural residents because of lower levels of
education [33,34]. The patron–client relationship remains one of
the more powerful systems for getting rural voters’ voices heard
and is often reinforced by the ‘clients’ themselves as many view
their own role as completed at the closing of the ballot boxes [Nat.
GO #6; Ac #2]. They have picked, elected or pledged loyalty to
their patron and it is now his/her job to represent their needs and
support them.
CBM, however, has its own limitations. For example, because of
severe resource depletion in a large bay in southern Thailand, pi-
lots projects were undertaken by the DoF and small-scale ﬁsheries
during the 1990s that involved extensive stakeholder participation
and community rule-making [37]. The objective of these pilots was
to eventually transfer permitting, zonation and enforcement to the
local region. However, the power to arrest for ﬁsheries violations
was kept ﬁrmly under the jurisdiction of the DoF through their
ﬁsheries patrol unit functions at a provincial level, despite the fact
that the Kham nan (yet not the TAO) always had powers to arrest
and conﬁscate gear [49]. Defending its decision to withhold this
power from the TAO, the government stated that local leaders and
community members were not willing or able to take full re-
sponsibly for the area, especially for the sanctioning of rules, be-
cause of ‘fall-out’ from powerful outsiders [37] higher up the po-
litical food chain.
5.2.4. Has decentralisation got a future?
If decentralisation for natural resource management and bio-
diversity conservation is to move forward, several conditions must
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important respect, ﬁsheries governance naturally lends itself to
decentralisation, as centralised governments, especially in devel-
oping countries, have minimal capacity to monitor, study, patrol
and enforce ﬁsheries regulations, whereas local communities are
able to oversee their own areas. However, local community man-
agement can only succeed if they can draw on a legal framework
to underpin their decisions.
Second, decentralisation requires sensitivity to the circum-
stances that are particular to each region, which in turn requires
responsiveness to local stakeholders. For example, embracing an
ecosystem-based approach in this process is important, and local
groups have shown high awareness of the particular ecological
risks in their areas and have demonstrated the capacity to effec-
tively respond at short notice [33,34]. Balancing expert and local
participation, however, is challenging in decentralised manage-
ment [41] as experts’ access to the volume of information required
(often centrally held) far outweighs that of local peoples’, yet both
bring knowledge at different scales. This brings us to the third
model of natural resource management – shared-governance.
5.3. Shared-governance system of resource management
Shared-governance in Thailand generally means community-
based projects with local government support or NGOs proposing
conservation projects and seeking community engagement. This
form of governance is less common than the previous two, but both
the 10th (2007–2011) and 11th (2012–2016) NESDP have been
heavily inﬂuenced by the Thai King’s Sufﬁciency Economy (SE) con-
cept, which is a philosophy which stresses the growth of community
capacity and participation for natural resource conservation with co-
management as a mechanism [35]. This philosophy, along with
widespread recognition of the failure of the state to curb environ-
mental destruction [19], has resulted in the implementation of some
large-scale natural resource management projects which promote
shared-governance as their preferred model. One such project is in
the farming sector. There has been much political protest in Bangkok
during the past 30 to 40 years over farmers demanding the right to
remain within, and farm, degraded land adjacent to NPs. A draft
forestry bill which supports inhabitants’ rights to legally remain
within and co-manage forest lands has been circulating since the
1980s, but is yet to be formally ratiﬁed [Nat. GO #1]. However, local
needs have forced the consideration of multi-use areas [Lo. Go #6;
Nat. GO #4; Ac. #1], and regional management arrangements mainly
at a provincial level have been negotiated. The Community Forest Bill
has legitimised some of these negotiations in forested areas, which
trades off ‘use’ in buffer zones in exchange for compliance with strict
protection of core zones.
Shared governance in ﬁsheries, however, appears a little more
advanced, possibly because of the state's incapacity to monopolise
sea use in the same way it can control land use. Whilst un-owned
land is a rarity in Thailand, the provision for un-owned ﬁsh which
are free in their natural environment and can be legally exploited
by anyone capable of catching them, means that marine property
rights are not as restrictive as land property rights, and co-man-
aged arrangements can be accommodated more easily in the
marine environment. Local ﬁsheries institutions have validated co-
management arrangements by entrusting some management
rights to local groups, ignoring gaps in current legislation [20].
Therefore, co-managed arrangements with well-deﬁned relations
between the local people and the DoF, whilst not yet common, are
being explored [Nat. GO #4].
5.3.1. Co-management Projects
One such project was the Coastal Habitat and Resource Man-
agement (CHARM) project which was a Thai Government-European Union collaboration that ran from 2002–2007 and
highlighted the inefﬁcient use of marine resources as a result of
institutional failing. This project aimed to introduce coastal re-
source co-management as a viable alternative to centralised
management. The approach was to deﬁne issues that needed to be
addressed at a site level and then formulate ideas which resolved
them at a local scale, for example establishing no-trawl areas and
the removal of destructive ﬁshing gears to improve inshore cat-
ches [7]. The process would then become a model which could be
applied to a variety of situations in other regions [19]. However,
the project was initially handicapped by internal disputes between
the DoF and the newly created DMCR in 2002 which led to 200
DoF staff being taken to form the DMCR, resulting in un-
cooperative behaviour. The 2004 Asian Tsunami dissolved this
dispute but understandably also changed the project’s objectives
to include aid relief as well as the promotion of co-management.
Nevertheless, the project has been claimed as a success both be-
cause ﬁsh yields in the co-managed areas have increased ([7] [Nat.
Go #4]) and because it developed a model for Integrated Coastal
Zone Management that can be applied elsewhere in the Thai
context.
Another important project which involved collaboration be-
tween local people and the DNP was the Joint Management of
Protected Areas (JOMPA) project which commenced in 2004 with
the objective of developing participatory joint management
structures for protected areas. The project worked at a number of
levels to draw in key stakeholders to address the loss of biodi-
versity, degraded ecosystems, and reduced livelihoods, and to
expand the opportunities for the rural poor in 11 terrestrial and
marine national parks. Centring on the DNP, a temporary provision
had to be made to allow community involvement, as this was not
authorised under the National Park Act. Whilst some of the pro-
ject's objectives were achieved, such as the establishment of the
Protected Area Committee (PAC), and community rules were
drafted, the 2004 Asian Tsunami refocused the project so that the
rehabilitation of communities and natural resources become the
priority. The PAC was, however, an interesting outcome and one
that remains in one marine National Park as a tool to gather in-
formation and complaints from local people about resource
management [Lo. Go #1: Lo. GO #6]. Whilst the PAC is a solid start
for co-management, there is no legal requirement for any PA to
have a PAC - it is at the discretion of each park superintendent
[31].
A more ambitious attempt to introduce Co-M into the Thai
approach to natural resource management is the draft Marine and
Coastal Bill, which is an integrated bill for coast, islands and sea
under the Department of Marine and Coastal Resource (DMCR).
Based on the 1992 NEQA, the bill aims to formalise co-manage-
ment between three levels of administration: national; provincial;
and local, each overseen by a committee. The bill is all-encom-
passing under eight ministries and numerous departments and is a
solid attempt to integrate principles from the Thai King’s self-
sufﬁciency (SE) philosophy and the wider-known concept of sus-
tainable development (SD) into nationwide legislation. Section 17
of the bill outlines duties for coordinated, realistic and informed
management approaches involving public participation through
provincial and local committees. Local committees are to be es-
tablished in each coastal community and would include re-
presentatives from traditional occupations, such as ﬁsheries,
farming, and trading, and different demographic groups, such as
housewives and youth groups. Community zones are proposed in
this bill under the remit of the local committees, which are re-
quired to prepare management plans to include demarcation,
regulations of use, compliance, enforcement and conﬂict resolu-
tion for the approval of the Provincial Committee. The Provincial
Committee has speciﬁc responsibilities for preparing and
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whilst approving or adjusting local marine and coastal resource
management plans. This bill began as a document with 300 sec-
tions, was redrafted down to 160 sections and was later cut to 23
sections where it currently remains. All integrated approaches
have been removed from it, and only the right for the DMCR to
establish MPAs remains [Nat. GO #1]. The bill was an ambitious
undertaking, and the review of ﬁsheries legislation since the ra-
tiﬁcation of the UNCLOS may provide an opportunity to re-present
some of its frameworks for supporting shared governance.
5.3.2. Has sharedgovernance got a future?
If shared governance is to expand in Thailand, three changes
need to take place. First, the successes and lessons learnt from
projects such as CHARM and JOMPA need to be applied when and
where relevant to other areas of the coast. Both projects involved
substantial international funding which is not a sustainable option,
but Thailand now has a working model and increased capacity to
take the lead especially within departments like the DMCR and
DoF. Second, empowerment of local communities is needed, and
mechanisms are required to incorporate local management ideas
[Ac #1; Ac. #4]. Third, a legal framework recognising community
management is required to support sharedgovernance, and whilst
the proposed bill by the DMCR appeared too radical, the path has
already been laid by the 1992 NEQA, so communities and shared
governance should be under serious consideration for the soon-to-
be-updated Fisheries Act [Nat. Go #1]. As prescribed under the
CBD, MNPs need to look at conservation together with sustainable
utilisation, because the current conservation-only system is in-
effective at best, or damaging to the marine environment at worst.
Shared governance is a viable option given the structure and ca-
pacity currently in place.6. Conclusions
This paper has tried to unravel the complexity of marine re-
source management in Thailand. There is considerable doc-
umentation on terrestrial management, but the marine environ-
ment is relatively new on the conservation agenda. However, since
Thailand’s ratiﬁcation of the CBD and more recently the UNCLOS,
more attention is expected to focus on marine governance. The
potential for more effective management of the marine environ-
ment is considerable, drawing on Thailand’s experience of terres-
trial management.
From the results of this study, sharedgovernance is the most
viable option available in Thailand to meet the CBD targets, for the
following reasons: (1) local participation can legitimise much of
the relationship with the centralised system and can help embed
the role of a decentralised system in natural resources manage-
ment; (2) the centralised system will still remain in ultimate
control, which makes shared governance arrangements more ac-
ceptable to powerful elites in the cities, and offers more oppor-
tunity to empower local people to take responsibility; and (3) the
capacity of all stakeholders can be built to deal with the complex
problems of the marine environment. Currently ﬁsheries and
coastal communities have the knowledge and understanding of
working on marine issues but lack management experience, while
the reverse is true of government departments. Therefore a
structure for shared governance is required before marine re-
source management can move away from the current centralised
system to a decentralised mode of governance capable of sus-
tainably managing the resource within CBD guidelines on behalf of
the Thai nation and its future generations.Acknowledgements
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